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PREFACE 
For over a decade now a wave of political management reforms has swept through in the 
developed, transitional and developing countries. The roles and institutional character of the 
state and the public sector have been under pressure to be market oriented and private sector 
oriented.  This plural version of the state approach most prominent in 1980s and 1990s 
became to be characterized as New Public Management.  The central feature of this 
ideology is its prescription of a new public–sector focus on efficiency, structural devolution, 
disaggregation, competition, management principles and increased used of contracts. It is in 
the same vein Norway and Tanzania reformed their respective health systems between 1999 
and 2005 based on a standardized prescriptions.   
This study comparatively explores the reforms in the two countries in the context of the 
wider debate about the shift from bureaucracy to post bureaucracy. Preference for post 
bureaucracy is a characteristic of the discourse of the NPM. The focus of the study is on the 
control mechanisms which are expected to devolve to lower hierarchies after the structural 
reforms to reflect post bureaucratic organization.  The study reported here does not confirm 
initial expectations that public organization have become post bureaucratic.  The reforms 
appear to break with the stated aims of great structural devolution and delegation. New 
forms of control, management by contract and results have emerged replacing management 
by command. The resilience of bureaucracy is found to be attributable to a number of factors 
including its necessity to good public management; rationalization; the paradox of social 
action and a need of integrated perspective because Bureaucratic organization is not a 
panacea and the answer to all challenges of public administration. Public administration face 
different challenges, command different resources, and are embedded in different political 
and administrative traditions. Bureaucratic organization is part of repertoire of overlapping, 
supplementary, and competing forms coexisting in contemporary democracy, and so are 
market and network organization. Divergence and convergence of the reform processes and 
its effects is another prominent feature observed. Here, the environmental, polity and 
respective administrative culture factors are being held liable for such differences and 
similarities. Norway with sound economy, and a strong statist traditions,  reformed  late, 
non radically and reluctantly while Tanzania with an underdeveloped, donor dependent 
underfinanced system started earlier and the reforms where radical and took longer time.   
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1. Introduction 
For over two decades now a wave of public sector management reforms has swept through 
in the developed, transitional and developing countries. The role and institutional character 
of the state and of the public sector have been under pressure to be more market-oriented and 
private sector-oriented (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994). According, to Ferlie et al (1996), this 
has been a product of a number of factors, including the economic and fiscal crises of the 
state that called the post-war consensus on the active role of the state in the economy into 
serious question in developed economies such as the United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia.  The crisis in the Keynesian welfare state in the developed economies led to the 
search for alternative ways of organizing and managing public services and redefining the 
role of the state to give more prominence to markets and competition, and to the private and 
voluntary sectors. The focus of the states upon market discipline as the solution to the ills of 
the public sector promoted marketization as the most efficient and effective way of 
providing services while promoting responsiveness to individual needs and user choice in 
service provision. 
This plural version of the state approach most prominent in 1980s and 1990s became 
characterized by different labels; ‘reinvention,’ ‘redesign’, ‘public sector reform’ and ‘the 
new public management (NPM) reforms’. The New Public management ideas of how to 
organize the public sector which are argued to work better and cost less (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992) have many facets and embrace a number of reform components. Segregation 
and Decentralization aimed at freedom to manage is one of the driving principles of the 
reforms. In practice it has meant decentralizing the management of public services by 
creating autonomous and semiautonomous agencies and delegating responsibility and 
resources to lower units within the public units (Pollitt et al, 1998).  The main appeal of 
decentralization lies in the claim that it helps to deliver improved performance and 
empowers managers by giving them more discretion and freedom from political and 
bureaucratic control. In return to their new freedom and consistence with the shift from input 
to output based accountability, managers will be held accountable for their performance of 
their organization (Hood, 1991).  Accordingly proponents of NPM have railed against 
bureaucracy in arguing for major reforms describing it as inflexible, rule bound and 
inefficient form organization. The bolder among them promised an end to bureaucracy as we 
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know it or banishing it or offered ways of breaking through or reinventing it (Barzelay 1992; 
Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Osborne and Plastrik 1997). They believed that bureaucratic 
organization is an obsolescent, undesirable, and non viable form of administration to cope 
with the tasks and circumstances faced and that there is inevitable and irreversible paradigm 
shift towards market or net work organization (Olsen 2005).  
This study, inspired by an international tradition in public administration that is theoretically 
informed and empirically oriented that combines political science and organization theory 
(Christensen and Lægreid 1998 b; March 1977) comparatively explores the impacts of NPM 
inspired health sector reforms recently implemented in Norway and Tanzania. The study 
examines what has happened over time in respect to the Organization dimension 
(decentralization, shift to desegregation of units, agencies, lean management, fewer 
hierarchies, and process management) specifically looking if the reforms have managed to 
end, banish or reinvent bureaucracy or offer ways of breaking through bureaucracy as 
prescribed and predicted by reformers. The comparison is based on central bureaucracies’ 
formal structures; administrative procedure and processes; and institutionalization of 
markets elements.  
1.1 What is the New Public Management (NPM)? 
A few observers have suggested that the term, New Public Management (NPM) is a 
misnomer. They argue that having been in the forefront of public management discourse for 
over three decades it can hardly be regarded as “new” today (Argyriades 2002). More 
controversially they suggested that to the extent that NPM undermines core public sectors 
values, it is not really about public management but an attempt to displace public 
administration as a distinct social science (sub) discipline and field of practice (Farazmand 
2000).  In spite of these criticisms, there is consensus today that NPM has made an 
important contribution to the public administration practically to all the countries. Des 
Gasper (2002) sums up the state of the art in his contribution to the many descriptions of 
New Public Management: 
   ….. ‘the New Public Management …emerged in 1980s especially in New Zealand, 
Australia and Britain and in sister form in the USA… they spread widely, especially in the 
1990s, around OEDC countries and from them to lower income countries, not at least in 
 8 
Africa, partly through promotion by  international agencies like the World bank, 
commonwealth secretariat and management consultancy group. At one stage NPM’s 
proponents claimed to have intellectually defeated the older public management and to be in 
the process of replacing it… NPM has done a lot to shake up sleepy and self serving public 
organizations, often by using ideas from the private sector. To provide many options for 
trying to achieve cost effective delivery of public goods, like separate organization for 
policy and implementation, performance contracts, internal markets, sub contracting and 
much more. But has spread somewhat like a religion: it was assumed to be modern, relevant 
and superior, so there was no need felt to prove that it suits the case concerned; to query this 
was held to show that you were outdated and reactionary… By now, NPM has lost much of 
its gloss, as experience mounts. In New Zealand, in many respect NPM’s furthest frontier, 
the costs of a too narrow approach to public management have been major and there is 
considerable backlash’.  
New Public Management is shorthand for a set of broadly similar administrative doctrines. It 
captures most structural, organizational and managerial changes in the public services. To 
quote Pollitt (1993), it is a vision, an ideology or a bundle of particular management 
approaches and techniques. NPM is thus seen as a body of managerial thoughts or as an 
ideology thoughts system based on ideas generated from the private sector and imported to 
the public sector. It emphasise shift from traditional public administration to public 
management. The elements of the reform emphasised by different scholars and prospective 
public sector innovators differ but its key principles have been summarised as including the 
following seven main elements (Hoods 1991): 
• A focus on hands-on and entrepreneurship management, as opposed to the 
traditional bureaucratic focus of the public administrator (Clarke and Newman 1993) 
• Explicit standards and measure of performance (Osborne et al 1995) 
• An emphasis on output control (Boyne 1999) 
• The importance of shift to Disaggregation and decentralization of public services ( 
Pollitt et al. 1998) 
• A shift to the promotion of competition in the provision of public services( Walsh 
1995) 
• A stress on private sector style of management and their superiority( Wilcox and 
Harrow 1992);and  
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• The promotion of discipline and parsimony in resource allocation (Metcalfe and 
Richards 1990) 
1.2 The ‘Old Public Management’ 
If there is a New Public Management then there must be an Old Public Management.  This 
paragraph intends to briefly highlight the ideas of earlier eras ‘traditional public 
administration’ and identify some of its main ideas which the advocates of NPM have been 
so keen in changing its patterns of governing.   The Old Public Management, according to 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992), was rule driven government ….locked up by rules and line 
items, and process driven routines. The underlying ideas were emphasis on ex ante and 
procedural control. The style of governance and administration was consistency with 
Weber’s ideas of bureaucracy. Max Weber asserted that a bureaucratic organisation was 
necessary for the achievement of organisational effectiveness and such organization should 
have the following characteristics: 
• The organization is guided by explicit specific procedures for governing 
activities 
• Activities are distributed among office holders 
• Offices are arranged in hierarchical fashion  
• Candidates are selected on basis of their technical competence. 
• Officials carry out their functions in an impersonal fashion (Weber, 1947)   
 
There is no doubt that the old style of public administration emphasizes a number of crucial 
principles for organizing public sector services that are challenged by NPM. Peters (1996) 
referred to them as ‘chestnuts’, an appropriate terminology, for that is what they are- the 
basics (table 1). Each of these ‘chest nuts’ represents an element of an administrative culture 
that took more that one century to be institutionalize them in industrialized countries and the 
antipodes. Because of this it required a profound form of administrative reform in each 
country.  It took so long because the changes affected not only the public sector but also the 
educational and the political subsystems (Oluwu 2002). The underlying idea of the 
reinventors of the government or organization management was to change these crucial 
principles. For example, decreasing emphasis on ex ante and procedural control would be 
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balanced by increased post ante evaluations of results, creating more discretionary space to 
managers to add value to public services. Key arguments have been that the old or traditional 
way of governing society is ill coped with tasks and circumstances faced. A paradigm shift 
from administering and governing through bureaucracies and hierarchies competitive 
markets and cooperation has been diagnosed and prescribed (Dunleavy and Hood 1994). 
 
 
Differential outcomes
Source: Extracted from Peters (1996)
Permanence and stability
Institutionalized civil services
Internal regulation 
Equality on Outcomes
Political and accountable management
Markets are superior to markets, emphasis on
contracts, not rules
 Contractual management
 Only small policy and a strategic centre
required
 Internal regulation only for the rump of the
services, not privatized or decentralized
Table 1: Old public administration chestnuts vs. the NPM doctrines
Old Public Administration New Public Management
Apolitical civil service
Hierarchy and Rules
 
1.3 Questions about the recent reforms 
This study intends to examine the recent implemented reforms in the Norwegian health 
sector contrasting them to those in Tanzania. By scrutinizing the process and assessing what 
has happened over time the study attempts to make sense of the reforms and answer four 
specific questions: 
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I. Have the reforms managed to end, invent or banish or break through bureaucracy?  
II. Is there a paradigm shift from bureaucracy to post bureaucracy? 
III. Is a bureaucratic organization an outdated, undesirable and non viable, unwanted 
form of organization?  
IV. Do the national reforms processes of the two countries characterized by any 
similarities or divergence engendered by national differences in economic, 
environmental, cultural and political administration context? 
1.4 Theoretical framework 
There are various frameworks in the literature that can used to explore the reforms, but there 
is no overriding theory that can capture all the key aspects, explain reforms process and 
effects in all situations, at all times and everywhere Pollitt (2004).  This study  will to a 
large extent seek to answer its research questions by revisiting Weber’s analysis of 
bureaucratic organization and by using combined: structural, cultural and myth based 
approach (Christensen and Lægreid 2007) in explaining the reform process and its effects. 
Advocates of reforms preached uncoupling steering from rowing to give service delivery and 
compliance agencies much more flexibility and autonomy (Osborne and Plastrik 1997). Such 
reforms will change the system and structure of the bureaucracy for effective management 
and will give an arm length performance contract between departments and agencies. The 
agencies will have more control over their resources to improve performance by using every 
tool in the reinventors’ kit: contracting out, public versus private competition, accrual 
accounting, performance bonuses, group bonuses, activity based costing, total quality 
management, customer survey, one stop office and on and on.  In bureaucratic systems, 
according to Osborne and colleague, government organization responds to new orders rather 
than to changing situation or customer’s needs.  The control strategy, decentralization and 
autonomy, intended to push significant decision making power down through the hierarchy. 
To shift the form of control used from detailed rules and hierarchical command to shared 
missions and systems that create accountability for performance. To empower organizations 
by loosening the grip of the central control agency, and to empower its employees by 
pushing authority to make decisions, respond to customers and solve problem down to those 
with frontline knowledge.   
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However the process of the reforms has not been the same everywhere. In some countries 
there might be a strong elements of diffusion from outside, where as in others the process of 
reforms might be a result of national or local initiative that have subsequently acquired NPM 
label (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Thus the spread of NPM is seen as a complex process 
and context based with different countries following its own trajectory within the broader 
framework of NPM (Christensen and Lægreid 2007).  The reform processes are not 
characterized by a simple instrumental view of organization decision making and change 
seen in administrative design: rather can be understood as a complex interplay of purposeful 
constrained by central and external factors.  One set of constraints is represented by the 
historical –institutional context while the other by the environmental characteristics. 
Institutional perspectives focus on culture norms and values of the organization, frequently 
how to make them stable and robust during fundamental change.  
For changes to happen both factors must be considered, the study will thus explore both the 
institutional and environmental factors in order to understand the reforms effects better. 
Three theoretical approaches are used here to help explaining the reform process and its 
effects: an instrumental approach emphasizing the formal hierarchical aspects of the reforms 
and health sector of the two countries, an institutional approach emphasizing the cultural 
features of the reforms, and an environmental approach discussing arguments connected to 
the characteristics of the political processes and policy types. Such approach will enable the 
study to explore unique contextual features of respective countries. 
1.5 Conceptual framework 
The analysis of this study will be aggregated at the national level.  This is the level were 
policies are formulated and steered through to the lower levels, hence making it possible for 
the study to characterize what is typical of the respective country. However, to understand 
better the changes that have happened over time in terms of autonomy and control 
administrative processes at the micro level will also be described and explored. In terms of 
understanding why certain features prevails and how reforms have been implemented 
explanatory factors; the transformative approach is used to explain the reform process and 
results.   
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Bureaucratic theory suggests a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the 
relations between organizational characteristics and administrative mentality, behaviour 
performance and change. Rationality is realized differently depending whether it is 
conceived as an instrument, institution or ideal. In comparing the change of organization 
forms of the two systems it is important to explore both the reform process and the 
environment.  Here, the respective reform processes are examined in relation to their 
specific contextual features. This is because, according to Dahl and Lindblom (1957), an 
active policy encompasses both elements of political control and rational calculation. It 
assumes that the organizational form to be used is open to conscious choice, implementation, 
and control by central political administrative actors; second, it assumes a tight coupling 
between goals and means, which are fulfilled through different organizational forms; third, it 
assumes that different organizational forms have different effects; and fourth, it assumes that 
there are criteria that could be used to assess those effects (Christensen et al 2002). 
However, Olsen (1992) argues that fulfilling these assumptions is difficult in practice and 
there is always a leeway for politicians to influence the process. The changes anticipated in 
reforms processes are influenced both by the historical -institutional contexts, environmental 
factors as well as the reform it self. It can be concluded that reform processes are not to be 
characterized by a simple instrumental view of organization decision making and change, 
rather can be understood as a complex interplay of purposeful constrained by central and 
external factors.  One set of constraints is represented by the historical –institutional 
context while the other by the environmental characteristics.   
It is in this respect that in order to understand better the reforms, their effects and 
specifically how control has evolved over time the study will thus use the transformation 
approach. 
1.6 Motivation of the research study 
The catchphrase in the hands on professional management element of NPM is ‘let manager 
manage’. It recognizes that there is a need for professional management at the top and that 
who holds these positions should be given substantive responsibility for management- the 
achievement of clear specified goals – rather than being administrators whose primary 
function is administrating rules.  The argument here is that accountability requires clear 
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assignment of responsibility, not diffusion of power.  To realize such goal organization 
have been broken into ‘corporatised units around products,’ funded separately and ‘dealing 
with one another on an "arm’s-length" basis.’ Being a health administrator my self and 
having just completed the NPM inspired reforms at my working place it has become 
important and timely for me to learn from others what have been experienced in terms of 
organizational control between centre and the lower hierarchies after disaggregation and 
decentralization, and find out if such experience travels well to the antipode. 
The study will be structured as follows: First, some characteristics of bureaucratic 
organization are described together with those of New and the Old public administration. 
The chapter will also state the aims and research questions of the study. Second, the 
methodology and study design is described. Third, bureaucratic organization and some 
theories of organization will be revisited to enrich our understanding of the control 
mechanism in organizations. Fourth, the health care systems of Norway and Tanzania are 
described and analyzed in relation to the recent NPM inspired reforms in the context of the 
wider debate about a paradigm shift to post bureaucracy. Fifth, aspects of administrative 
dynamics and the viability of bureaucratic organization are explored and discussed in respect 
to NPM practices, highlighting positive implications of bureaucracy followed by conclusions 
in chapter six. 
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2. Methodology 
This study uses a descriptive analytical qualitative technique to answer its research questions 
by examining what has happened over time following the recent NPM inspired health sector 
reforms in both countries, specifically exploring evidence of shift to post bureaucracy.  
2.1 Methods 
Most of the research on organizational evolution does not clearly distinguish between 
structure and values. As Hinings et al (1996: 889) suggest, although institutional theory 
implies a tight relationship between values and structure, it recognizes that structures may 
change without a proportionate change in values. In order to answer questions about 
transition to post bureaucratic organization it might be necessary to examine the shared 
understanding and culture or beliefs that underlie the organizational structure which play a 
role in constructing the reality of an organizational type (Feldman 1986).  This study was 
not able to examine the values but looked into conformity of post bureaucratic 
characteristics of the organizations which can shed light of the shared values of the 
respective organizations. The characteristics of the organizations are unfolded by reviewing 
documents both published and unpublished.  
The two countries, Norway and Tanzania, are used as comparative case studies in this thesis 
trying to answer the questions ‘what’ ‘how’ and ‘why’ has happened over time in the reforms 
in respect to  the  characteristics of the  organization structure and control mechanism.  
Being a case thesis the study has a very theoretical approach to the research questions. The 
objective are achieved by reviewing secondary data i.e., Published and unpublished 
documents from respective countries, and by extracting descriptive statistics from exiting 
data bases.  Analysis of the documents involved answering questions whether the 
documents referred to NPM inspired reforms, the stage of the reform, the stakeholders 
involved and the outcome realized. The bulk of the literature used is from international 
literature search and unpublished government documents.  This case thesis study 
extensively use theory ‘theory interpreting case thesis’ to describe and interpret 
retrospectively the organizational characteristics developed over time with the reforms. 
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Electronic bibliography search was conducted from 1970s to 2008 using key words: 
organization, organization theory, bureaucratic, post bureaucratic, new management reform, 
public administration, decentralization, autonomy, health care reform and primary health 
care. The search cited over 2000 articles but most from developing countries and reforms in 
other areas. A combined search using the word ‘in health’, and ‘in developing countries’ 
found 50 articles which was used in this study. 
But what is the underlying comparative design for the two countries with a mixture of 
different and similar national features?  Focusing on comparative dynamics of the reform 
wave, the study, inline with the approach taken by Frendreis (1983), will adopt the mixed 
system research strategy by combining most similar and most different system design 
The main set of dependent variable is decision making behaviour connected to reform effects 
aggregated at national level specifically focusing on how the power of control has evolved 
over time with the reforms between the centre and the lower hierarchies. The independent 
variables in the study are; disaggregation, decentralization, deregulation, single purpose 
organization and institutionalization of market solutions. These are  examined using the  
transformative approach with its three perspectives; an instrumental approach addressing the 
formal and hierarchal aspect of the reform, an environmental approach discussing arguments 
connected to the characteristics of the political process and policy types, and an institutional 
approach stressing the cultural features 
2.2 Study Analysis and Limitations  
In order to classify conformity to the reforms and compare the two countries the study has 
utilized a simple point system (see table 3) that is designed to give somebody an overview of 
implementation.  A yes indicates specific adoption of that specific component of NPM; a 
No score indicates predominance of old traditional hierarchal model of public 
administration. However, as with all approaches where qualitative measures prevails , the 
proposed  simplified classification suffers from certain weaknesses: the first is subjective 
nature of the judgments  and assessment made, in particular with reference to interim 
situations, despite that they are based on official sources. The second regards the adopted 
method it self, that is, the decision to award clear cut marks to such complex phenomena as 
the contents of administrative reforms. Other limitation not associated directly with the 
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technique of evaluation includes; over reliance of secondary data may lack contextual 
specificity Validity of a pragmatic study; failure of the study to use other complimentary 
methods to the theoretical perspectives such as in depth interview and key informant 
interview; unavailability of literature from developing countries including Tanzania about 
the implementation and success of the reforms and when available the information was very 
old. Due to such limitation of information the study was restricted to using old documents 
and over reliance on authors’ experience; and, as the framework for data collection differed 
between the studies, the information allows limited comparative analysis. Finding (see table 
2)are however brought together to the extent possible, to illustrate how similar reforms 
intention may have similarities or different implications and outcomes in different context as 
the purpose is to discuss differences as well as common features of the reforms. 
Nevertheless, I believe the information available can provide a comparative overview of the 
reform implementation between the two countries.  
The major finding of the study is non conformity to post bureaucracy characteristics despite: 
showing pronounced shift towards decentralised units; increasing dominance in principles of 
competition and, substantial dominance of process of performance management (see 4.7). 
Other findings include presence of both elements of divergence and convergence, and 
evidence of editing of the reform prescriptions. 
2.3 Validity and Reliability 
The quality of a study depends on its validity and reliability. Validity is defined as the 
degree to which the researcher has measured what he has intended out to measure (Kumar 
2003:153) or as data relevance for the research question. That is to say, validity depends on 
the data appropriateness and validity for the research question. The reliability on the other 
hand says something about the consistency and stability of the instrument. The reliability 
then says something about the accuracy of the process measurement of data. Being an 
explanatory case thesis relying on literature to interpret and explain the reforms this study 
will rely on the result of combining the theoretical perspectives to the empirical evidences 
that have been used to illuminate the important aspects of the theory. Official documents on 
the other hand do not conflict with the reliability concept. 
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3. Bureaucratic Organization and the theories 
3.1 Introduction 
Organizations are systems of coordinated action among individuals and groups whose 
preferences, information, interests or knowledge differ. Organization theories describe the 
delicate conversation of conflict into cooperation, the mobilization of resources, and 
coordination of effort that facilitates the joint survival of an organization and its members 
(March and Simons 1993). A number of organization forms exist in contemporary 
democracies, one being bureaucratic organization (a focus of this study), but because public 
administration faces different challenges, command different resources and are embedded in 
different political and administrative tradition a single dominant organizational model may 
not suffice.  
In order to understand more on organization dynamics, it is important to study both 
organization consisting people and people in the organization context. In that respect this 
chapter intends to review the bureaucracy theory as well as the instrumental and institutional 
perspectives along the way in order to understand and make follow up of the reforms effects 
and processes.  
3.2 Bureaucracy, Bureaucrats, Bureaucratization 
‘Bureaucracy’ is an overworked concept and often unclear one.  It is, as Albrow (1970) has 
put it, ‘a term of strong emotive overtones and elusive connotations’. Albrow distinguishes 
seven separate though related modern meanings of the term. They include: for most neutral, 
a centrally directed, systematically organized and hierarchically structured staff devoted to 
the regular, routine and efficient carrying out large scale administrative tasks according to 
the policies dictated by, rulers or directors standing outside and above bureaucracy. Such 
staffs, as Weber rightly saw, tend to become rule bound, functionally specialized, elevating 
impersonality and ensprit de corps.  But bureaucracy has also meant the opposite of 
organization efficiency and effective centralized control: red tape, slowness of procedure, 
reluctance to take decision, the unnecessary multiplication of people, rule and forms. The 
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term bureaucracy has also included in, but also contrasted with, the general concept of 
administration, sometimes seeing bureaucracy as a formal and impersonal mode of 
administration where administrators have become the real rulers, arrogating to themselves 
privilege, power and control, and thus prejudicing the liberties of ordinary citizens or the 
power  of their nominal ruler(s).  Not only administrative forms or staffs, but the whole 
societies have been described as ‘bureaucratic’ on that basis, some distinguish modern state 
centred and highly or pervasively administered societies from looser, more traditional and 
less rationalistic societies of the past.  But quite often bureaucracy is used as a pejorative 
slogan, as well as a label for public administration or large scale organization. 
Accordingly Max Weber, made bureaucracy an analytical concept decoupling it from the 
controversial context in which it emerges (Albrow 1970). And here the term signifies, an 
office or bureau: which is a centrally directed, systematically organized with hierarchies. 
Second, a professional, fulltime administrative staff with life long employment, organized 
careers, selected (not elected) to office and rewarded on the basis of their qualification (and 
not nepotism), merit and were compensated via a salary and pension. Third, a larger 
organizational and normative structure where government is founded on authority, that is, 
the belief in a legitimate, rational legal political order and the right of the state to define and 
enforce legal order. Binding authority is claimed through a fourfold rule bound hierarchal 
relation: between citizens and elected representatives, between democratic legislation and 
administration, within administration, and between administration and citizens as subjects of 
law’ (Olsen 2005) Bureaucratization then refers to the emergence and growth of bureaucratic 
forms and not to the perversions and illegitimate extension of the power of bureaucrats’.  
Bureaucratic theory thus suggests a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between organizational characteristic and administrative mentality, behaviour, 
performance and change. One assumption is rationality and control are attributes of 
organization structure and that it matters how the public administration is organized or 
organizational forms can be deliberately developed. However, the interpretation of these 
assumptions depends on whether bureaucracy is conceived as an instrument, institution, as 
an ideal type or its approximations (Olsen 2005).  
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3.2.1 As an Instrument 
Instrumental perspective considers organizations as tools or instruments of achieving 
societal goals or rational tools for executing commands from elected leaders. According to 
Christensen et al (2007), instrumental perspective in can be expressed in two ways, one, by 
the way organizations and their members acting with instrumental rationality in fulfilling 
and achieving desired results. This entails members of organization assessing the available 
alternatives according to their consequences and in relation to the chosen goals and making 
wilful choice between the alternatives. Second, instrumentality can be expressed in the 
structural design of an organization in accordance with means-end assessments which in turn 
determines how the members behave while carrying out tasks. Instrumental rationality can 
thus involve both the effect of organizational structure and the process whereby that 
structure is determined and formed (ibid).   
In the instrumentally rational actions, organization goals - ideas about what they would like 
achieve or realize in future, are defined ex-ante. Problem solving implies actions that aim to 
reduce or eliminate the distance between desired and actual state of affairs which is achieved 
by logic of consequences. The instrumental rational action consists of: goal or problem, 
alternatives- possible action, consequences (expectations) and decision making rules. 
Organization will then asses possible alternatives based upon their consequences and choice 
made accordingly. The actions required to implement the tasks are also marked by their 
relation of logic of consequences where the organizational chooses between the alternatives, 
based upon rational calculations of possible consequences. 
Instrumental rationality can also be the effect of formal structure of the organization. 
Organizing via the design of the formal organizational structure happens to varying degrees, 
through specialization and coordination. How the organization is specialized and 
coordinated can effect on the relation between position and subunits the organization is 
composed of, relations with the larger units of which the organization is a part, and relations 
with the other organization. The concept of full instrumental rationality which refers to an 
organization with clear goals and full overview of all alternatives is rarely realized in 
practice. Three reasons which are crystallized by the contribution of bounded rationality are 
elaborated below: one, organizations goals are believed to be diffuse, inconsistence or 
unstable and the problem it faces are complex.  Because of this it often follows that the 
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organization chooses the best available alternative rather than the best. Second, Simon’s 
(1947) work on organization efficiency introduced the notion bounded rationality departing 
from individual action in organizations, outlines an administrative man. As a contrast to the 
‘economical man’, who is motivated by self interest and with full knowledge of all 
alternatives and consequences the ‘administrative man’ acts within the determinant structure 
but with incomplete knowledge of alternatives and consequences. Thirdly, is the 
contribution of the work of Scott (1981) who developed what he labelled rational 
organizational perspective. Basing on Simon’s ideas about bounded rationality that linked 
individual to decision making, Scott argues on  rational organization where organizations 
as  instruments for goal achievement poses clear limitations on individual roles that is to 
say rationality at the organization level can be strengthened  through structure features 
which both constrain and enable the organizational instrumental’s action. 
Dysfunctions of instrumental perspective (bureaucracy) can best be described through the 
seminal works of different scholars. Merton (1957) found that a fundamental failure of 
bureaucracy was its tendency to foster ‘goal displacement’. Excessive adherence and 
conformity to rules and regulations resulted in rules becoming ends in themselves, and 
sometimes prevented organizations from achieving their goals. Additionally, members in 
bureaucracy often apply formal rules and procedures in unsuitable situations –for example in 
unique station, treating them as routine-thus resulting in dysfunctional outcomes.  Selznick 
(1947) discovered the phenomenon of ‘sub optimization’ in bureaucracies; i.e. delegation of 
authority resulted in organizational sub-units pursuing goals that were different from stated 
goals of the organization as whole. Burns and Stalk (1961) observed that highly bureaucratic 
organizations were resistant to change. A prevailing atmosphere of hierarchy, control, 
efficiency and predictability meant that organizational members favoured self-continuity and 
felt threatened by change. Such organization, were poor at innovating or embracing new 
ideas.  Gouldner (1954) found that the ‘govern according to rules’ culture in bureaucratic 
organization led to the consequence of members following the minimum possible rules in 
order to get by. Thus it was problematic to obtain much more than minimally acceptable 
behaviour from members.  Blau (1956) proposed that in bureaucratic organization, certain 
people who knew how to ‘play by the rules’, i.e. become gradually more powerful. Thus 
leaders tended to shift from the nominal leaders of these organizations, who did not 
necessary know how to play the rules, to people who did. 
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However, scholars have also found that bureaucracy works well in certain contexts and the 
theory of bureaucracy has been used in a variety of context to analyze and understand 
organization in society (Eisenstadt 1968). One explanation of this is by conceiving 
bureaucracy as an institution. As Selznick (1957) asserted, the distinction between an 
organization as an instrument and as an institution is a matter of analysis not description. He 
further went on to argue that organizations are for coordinated action, but through time they 
are infused with values and become not just simple instruments that one can discard when 
the job is done but institutions, the theme of the following section. 
3.2.2 As an Institution 
Institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It 
considers the processes by which structures; including rules, norms, and routines, become 
established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. It inquires into how these 
elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall 
into decline and disuse (Scott, 1981). Tom Christensen and colleagues distinguishes two 
forms of institutional perspective, a culture perspective that is the idea of institutionalized 
organization and a myth perspective which entails the idea of an institutionalized 
environment, focusing on the values and norms present in an organization.   
The culture perspective has to do with informal norms and values that have accrued over 
time and become important for the activities of formal organization.  American 
organization theorist Selznick (1949) provides a classic distinction between the institutions 
where informal norms grow gradually, in organic process and the organization, which has 
formal norms associated with the instrumental, tool like and ‘mechanical’. Accordingly, 
when a formal organization develops informal norms and values in additional to the formal 
variety, it acquires institutional features, and one speaks of institutionalized organization. In 
this perspective organizations get infused with values beyond technical requirements at 
hand. Such features make the organizations more complex, less flexible or adaptable to new 
demands and also equipped with new and necessary qualities that will potentially help the 
organization to solve tasks more expediently and function well as a social integrated unit. 
(Christensen et al 2007). 
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There is a vast literature within the organizational theory that supports the socio-cultural 
perspective that informal norms and value can potentially have an instrumental side, that is 
informal norms and values can be useful. The Hawthorne studies provides an example of 
this, original constructed as a series of Taylorist experiments in scientific job design, the 
classic Hawthorne studies (Elton Mayo 1933; 1939), ended up demonstrating the importance 
of social phenomena on human organization behaviours, including: 
• The importance of informal social groups on increasing or limiting work place 
motivation and performance; 
• The relationship between groups’ standards and broader societal norms, customs and 
routines; 
• The importance of relationship with supervisors; and 
• That simple communication and interaction with workers can results in increased 
motivation and performance (the famous Hawthorne effect). 
Other example includes the work of Roethlisberger and Dickson(1939)  whom highlighted 
certain unique characteristics of the human factor in organization which mitigated against 
standardized, mechanistic approaches; Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy needs and McGregor’s 
(1960) Theory X and Theory Y.  These studies also demonstrated the divergence between 
how things were supposed to function and how things actually worked in practice. They 
have documented the importance of human agency, resistance and innovation in every 
bureaucratic functioning.  
The foundational logic of action tied to organizational culture perspective is labelled the 
logic of appropriate behaviour or appropriateness.  This logic means that, when acting in 
public situations, members of the organization will not act primarily rationally according to 
the formal rules and norms of the organization or out of self assessment of possible 
consequences of actions. Instead they suggest that members will engage in matching, 
whereby rules for action are deployed in order to link situation and identities (Tom 
Christensen et al 2007).  Matching situation and an identity may have various origins. 
These include: learning from experience (knowledge of in which situation one should 
activate various rules and identity); categorization (development of complex categories or 
‘mental maps’ for rules and identities); proximity of time (reuse of recently used identities 
and rules); decontextualization (experience of others of same oneself situation) and 
contextualization (experience and models from other organization of similar culture). The 
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logic of appropriateness clearly brings benefits because complex action stimuli are 
responded to with standardized, almost intuitive actions. 
On the other hand the myth perspective organization must try to incorporate and reflect their 
norms outwardly, even if they do not make their organizational effectively (Christensen et al 
2007).  Through this process organizations become similar to one another, at least on 
surface. These socially created norms in the institutional environment, myth, when adopted 
can either produce or fail to produce the instrumental effect 
Changing of organizational culture 
The significance of organizational culture often becomes apparent when organization goes 
through a process of reforms and reorganizations particularly if these processes threaten 
dominant informal norms and values. A pertinent example is the cultural hostility to reforms 
posed by NPM ideologies in countries with a strong and all concept of the state such as 
Norway and Tanzania. In other studies of organization culture notably from the business 
school culture one find a different perspective. Here it is often claimed that organization 
culture can be designed or created deliberately, that is , culture are things organizations  
have, variables leaders can manipulate to achieve desired results, for example see Osborne 
and Plastrik (1997, pg 43). Having a central notion of path dependency this is a typical 
instrumental perspective in the development of organizational culture. The cultural 
perspective raises problems for such simplistic approach to the coordination and control of 
work as well as the implementation of organizational change. Members of organizations are 
reflective, responsive human being embedded in networks of social relations rather than 
simply part of organizational machinery or completely rational economical individuals. 
Therefore, they cannot be expected to simply comply with new policies and procedures and 
may not respond as anticipated to changes in an incentive structure.   
3.2.3 As an ideal type 
As an ideal type bureaucracy has clear characteristics, precondition and effects as shown in 
section 4.2. Olsen (2005) suggests that practice at its best approximates the ideal type but 
public administration is never a fully developed bureaucracy. Weber (1978, 1002) 
wrote…‘one must keep one’s eye on fluidity and the overlapping of all these organizational 
principles. Their pure types, after all, are considered merely border cases which are special 
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and indispensable analytical value and bracket history reality which almost always appears 
in mixed form’.  According to Weber there are fluid and overlapping organizational 
principles and the functioning, emergence, growth and consequences depends on a number 
of factors.  These include beliefs in legitimate order; the human factor as guided by culture, 
utility, affinity and traditions; how often and under which condition do bureaucrats comply 
with the rules; capacity and incentives of the bureaucrats to follow the rules; motivation to 
the bureaucrats; ability of leaders to give direction and availability of resources; and, the 
attitudes of the masters controlling the bureaucratic machine.  Yet, according to Olsen 
(2005), incentives and socialization mechanisms could not be expected to be perfect, and 
elected leaders could lack the knowledge and authority to direct and control administration 
promoting contradictions or morally dubious objectives. As a result there is always a 
potential of conflict between bureaucrats, elected officials and citizens and the causal 
command to actual compliance could be long and uncertain as Weber said….‘ the final result 
of political action often, no even regularly, stands in complete inadequate often even 
paradoxical relation to its original meaning’  
3.3  Summary 
Making sense of contemporary public administration, then, requires an understanding of the 
complex science of relationship of institutions, actors, rules, values, principles, goals, 
interests, beliefs, power and cleavages in which it operates. Administration is rarely 
provided with clear and stable of failure and success. Different people are likely to have 
different opinion of what a good public administration is. Weber for example, emphasized 
the technical superiority and the procedural rationality of bureaucracy, in contrast to the 
assertion that the bureaucratic organization is undesirable and should be replaced by 
competitive markets and power sharing networks. Bureaucracy here is assessed 
instrumentally, based on the expected contribution to realized predetermined goals and the 
governing in which bureaucracy is founded (Olsen 1997).   A complication is that the 
functionally best solution is not always politically or culturally feasible and vice versa 
(Merton 1938). 
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4. The two health systems and the NPM inspired reform 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter one, NPM was defined and the perceived shortfalls of the ‘old era’ were stated. 
These introductory remarks were meant to form a base on which NPM perspective could be 
used as a background to the description and analysis of the recent health care reforms in 
Norway and Tanzania. This chapter intends to describe and analyze the recent NPM inspired 
reforms of the two health systems using the transformative approach. The empirical basis of 
the study is mainly drawn from literature with compliments on author’s experiences of 
working in the Tanzanian health sector.  
The main set of dependent variable is decision making behaviour connected to reform effects 
aggregated at national level specifically focusing on how the power of control has evolved 
over time with the reforms between the centre and the lower hierarchies.  Disaggregation, 
decentralization, deregulation, single purpose organization, processes and institutionalization 
of market solutions define the independent variables in the study. These are examined in the 
context of environmental characteristics, polity and the historical-institution features, the 
transformative approach.  
The assumption is that the explanatory factors in transformative perspective may transform 
NPM ideas. Through the complex mix of external economic and ideological factors, internal 
polity features and policy and national institutional context the NPM reforms are 
transformed through a change process.  Reforms ideas and solution are partly affected by 
situational factors and through national administrative policy constrained by polity features 
and culture and tradition. Figure 1 outlines the study analysis model; discussion on the 
findings is conducted in the next chapter. 
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4.2 Figure1: The Module of Analysis 
Explanatory factors ‘reform context’  
The Environment The Polity Administrative 
Culture 
 
• Economy • Constitutional 
   • Historical- 
Institutional 
history  • Ideology • Structural 
• Style of 
governance 
 
 
The transformation of NPM reforms process 
‘reforms’ 
• Disaggregation 
• Decentralization 
• Deregulation 
• Contractualization 
• Single purpose organization 
• Administrative processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 Marketilization•
 
Explanatory factors 
Results and Effects 
 
 
 The transformation of reform theory and 
democratic ideas 
Discussion reform theory/public organization 
 
 
Source: adapted from Christensen and Lægreid (2001) 
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4.2 Degree of NPM implementation 
For over two decades now the New Public Management perspective has been the 
predominant interpretation of any reforms undertaken in the public sector.  Key elements of 
the perspective include disaggregation and decentralization management within public sector 
( e.g. the creation of autonomous agencies and devolution of budgets and control), increased 
use of markets and competition in the provision of public services ( e.g. contracting out and 
other market-type mechanism) and increase emphasis on performance, output and customer 
orientation. The recipe of NPM elaborated here is based on the influential work of David 
Osborne and Peter Plastrik (1997), banishing bureaucracy. David and colleague present a 
narrative of how public systems and organization can increase efficiency, effectiveness, 
adaptability and capacity to innovate. Osborne and Plastrik sketches out five strategies of 
which the system and the structure of bureaucracy would have to change in order to attain 
this. This study will adopt these strategies as an intentional effort to change and make it a 
requirement that the reform must contain some of the criteria in order for a reform to qualify 
a label of NPM inspired reforms (see table 3 for compliance), their prescribed strategies are: 
• The core strategy. Determine the purpose, Separate “steering” (policy and 
regulatory) functions from “rowing” (service delivery and compliance functions).  
• The consequences strategy. Determine the incentives, create consequences for 
performance e.g. putting public organization into marketplace and make them depend 
on their customers for their revenues or contracting out to create competition 
between public and private or public and public organizations 
•  The customer strategy. Focus on accountability; shift some accountability from 
elected officials (whom they claim are under constant pressure to respond to the 
demands of interest groups) to customers. 
• The control strategy. Determines where decision making lie, Push significant 
decision making power down through the hierarchy, and at times to the community 
to empower the organization(line managers) by loosening the grip of the central 
control. It will shift the form of control from details rules and hierarchy commands to 
shared missions and systems that create accountability for performance. 
• The culture strategy. Determine the culture of the organization, the values, norms, 
attitude and expectation of employee should change. This is shaped by the 
organization purpose, its accountability system, its incentives and power structure. 
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4.3 Adoption and implementation of the reforms 
There are different schools of thought regarding to the adoption and implementation of the 
NPM reforms. Christensen and Lægreid (2007) illuminate two possibilities, first, as a result 
of national and local initiatives that have subsequently acquired a NPM label and second, as 
a diffusion of ideas from outside contingent to the national historical institutional culture 
context.  This environmental determinism (Olsen 1992) can be of two kinds. In the first 
instance a country may adopt internationally based norms and beliefs simply because these 
have become the prevailing doctrines. Such reform ideas create pressure for similar reforms 
and structure changes elsewhere in what they describe as a diffusion process. In the second 
instance, NPM may be seen as an optimal solution to wide spread technical problems and is 
adopted to solve problems created by a lack of instrumental performance or by economical 
competition and market pressure. In this instance NPM reforms are adopted not because of 
their ideological hegemony but because of their technical efficiency.       
The other view that holds about reforms is that they are primary the product of the national 
institutional context. Different countries have different culture traditional and that there 
reforms are ‘path dependant’, that is, have unique features (Selznick 1957; March and Olsen, 
1989). This view stresses focus on the traditional context, norms and, values that have a 
major impact on the institutional features of organizations. The national culture serves to 
make the reforms stable, integrated and robust to fundamental changes (Krasner 1988; 
Selznick 1957) or incompatible. Reforms may have norms and values that are highly 
incompatible with the traditional cultural norms and values of the political administrative 
systems of specific countries, resulting into difficulties in integration. 
 
 
 
The case of Norway 
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4.4 The Norwegian health system 
The organizational structure of the Norwegian health system is built on principles of equal 
access to services: all inhabitants should have the same opportunity to access health services, 
regardless of social and economical status and geographical location (European Observatory 
on Health Systems and Policies, 2006). To fulfil this aim, the organizational structure has 
three levels that mirror political tiers: the national/state level, the four health regions and the 
municipalities (see appendix3). While the role of state is to determine national policy, to 
prepare and oversee legislation and allocate the funds, the main responsibility for the 
provision  for the provision of health care services lies with the four health regions for 
specialist care and the 431 municipalities for primary health care (which includes nursing 
care), and dental care at the 19 counties. At national level, the parliament (Stortinget) serves 
as the political decision-making body. Overall responsibility for the health care sector rests 
at the national level, with the Ministry of Health and care services. The ministry of health 
and care services outlines national health policy, prepares reforms and proposes for 
legislation, monitors their implementation and the assists the government in decision 
making. The ministry has administrative responsibility for the following subordinate’s 
agencies: the directorate for Health and social affairs, the board of health, institute of public 
health, the medicines agency, the radiation protection authority, the patient register and the 
biotechnology advisory board. 
Prior to the 2002 reforms, the Norwegian health care sector could be characterized as a 
decentralized version of the National Health System(NHS) model (Rice and Smith,2002): 
funding was tax  based, the main actors were public, and compared with the British NHS, 
local, and county governments had significant role in health care decisions. The institution 
set up is in the same vein as the health care system, with three geographical and functional 
levels: the state, the counties, and the local levels. According to Hagen and Sorensen (1997 
as quoted in Midttun and Hagen 2006), the scope of services devolving to the local level has 
increased substantially over time. It was hoped that through decentralization it will be 
possible to lessen bureaucracy, improve management and enhance user information and give 
more power to the lower hierarchies.  
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4.4.1 The reforms context 
Norway had been seen as a reluctant reformer (Olsen 1996). According to Christensen 
(2003) possible explanations include: environmental pressure was weak, their Rechsstaat ( 
juridical state that exercises power under the law) culture and strong egalitarian norms were 
less compatible with the values of NPM, there were more obvious constitutional obstacles, 
and parliamentary conditions, often characterized by minority coalition government, made a 
radical reforms strategy difficult to pursue.  Until 1990s major public domains were 
organized as central agencies or government administrative enterprise. However, by mid 
1990s greater structural devolution was becoming common in public administration. The 
reforms consisted of internal delegation of authority to the agencies and external structural 
devolutions through the establishment of state own companies. These single purpose models 
have been increasingly replacing the former integrated civil service (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2001a, 2001b). Central control, however, has been comprehensive, and the 
governing system is therefore best described as centralized.  Implementation and adoption 
of reforms in Norway can be described to follow the Myth perspective, socially legitimized 
recipe in the institutional environment for how to design part of organizations. In this 
instance a country may adopt internationally based norms and beliefs simply because these 
have become the prevailing doctrines. Such reform ideas create pressure for similar reforms 
and structure changes (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). 
  
In the health sector, hospital reforms were also implemented as an inspiration from the 
NPM. The focus was how to make them efficient by introducing business model and steering 
framework as a main political control device (Lægreid et al, 2005). The introduction of the 
enterprise model can thus be seen as part of the larger shift in the Norwegian public 
administration which can be argued to be an ideological shift towards neoliberal and private 
sector model with an introduction of most popular organizational form of the time. Within 
the health sector (hospital reforms), Norway was pursuing other NPM reforms parallel to the 
hospital reforms.  Principles of unitary management were introduced together with quasi 
markets and performance measurements models through principles of free patient’s choices.   
Other reforms include, the activity based funding system based on diagnosis (DRG) and a 
more comprehensive and transparent quality control system (Byrkjeflot 2004). The 
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development in Norway reflects to some extent the broader effort throughout Europe to 
incorporate NPM principles in governance of health care.  
 
However, the Norwegian case is not just pure market and management model as it doesn’t 
represent a privatization of the hospital sector and does not go very far in promoting market 
mechanism. This according to Christensen and Lægreid can be explained in the light of 
Norwegian historical context of ‘state perspective and professional perspectives’. …….‘ 
What we see is a decentralized company  structure of managers and health enterprises with 
delegated responsibilities constrained by professional stewardship and integrated into system 
under tight executive control and instruction from the central’, concluded Opedal and 
Rommetvedt (2005) cited in Lægreid et al, (2005).  
4.4.2 The Reforms 
Norwegian Health care reform plan which took effect from 2002 and fulfills the 
requirements of being a reforming organization inspired by NPM ideas.  Independently, 
(OECD 2003; Byrkjeflot 2005; Lægreid et al 2005; Hagen and Kaaboe 2006) report that; the 
reforms transferred the responsibility for public hospitals from the counties to the central 
government. Five regional health enterprises were established and which in turn have 
organized hospitals under local health enterprises.  These local enterprises are separate 
entities of varying size and geographical spans. Both the regional and the local enterprises 
have their own executive boards and managing directors. The minister of Health however 
appoints the boards of the regional enterprise and the directors of the regional enterprises 
and the board of the enterprises are appointed by the regional board. The health sector 
reforms is something of a hybrid, prescribing both centralization by transferring ownership 
from the region level to the central government, and decentralization, autonomy to the 
sublevels of the  health enterprise.  
The reforms were intended to enhance coordination and efficient utilization of resources and 
ensure equity of access to health services for citizens in all parts of the country as a remedy 
to a number of perceived problems of the health care system.  The prevailing arguments 
include; increased use of resources combined with continuous financial strain. This was 
compounded by blurred division of overall responsibility between the counties and central 
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government because although the counties were owners but in practice the central 
government had overall responsibility. Second, the development of profession specialization 
of medical health which needed organization of patients across counties and thirdly, the 
variation of the services offered between counties. Fourth, the counties executed their 
ownership in different ways. Some practiced management by objectives whereas others 
exercised detailed control vis-à-vis the hospitals. To fulfil these goals a stronger central 
government control and responsibility combined with clear defined goals for the enterprises 
and increased operational responsibility was needed as policy instruments, Per Lægreid et al 
(2005). No changes were introduced in the system of funding, which combined block grants 
and activity based funding from the central government to the regional which in turn allocate 
to the local enterprises.   
Accordingly, centralization of ownership was aimed at increasing steering, in order to deal 
with what was seen as unclear division of responsibility, different and ineffective use of 
financial resources, disparate access to health in the population, increased politically 
interferences at the regional level and lack of professional administrative leadership.  On 
the other hand, decentralization also changed the organization form of the hospital from 
public administration entities to become parts of health enterprises with the new pattern 
recognizing the ministry of health as owner.   In this new set up the ministry of the health 
who is the owner of the hospital control the enterprise at arm’s length.      
The new strategies for enhancing control include, appointing the regional board members the 
majority of whom are employees. Second, the ministry exercises control through the Health 
enterprise act, through article of association, through steering documents (contracts), and 
through decisions adopted by enterprise meeting (Opedal 2004).  Third, the state finances 
most of hospital activities and the central government thus controls them by allocating funds 
to the enterprises. Fourth, through a formal performance monitoring system this includes a 
letter specifying tasks and objectives. Through the extensive use of contracts, political 
leaders are supposed to specify targets and objectives clearly, and controlled is being using 
quantitative indicators for monitoring results and measuring efficiency, Per Lægreid et al 
(2005).  
In summary, the Norwegian health care reforms was adopted as Myths, socially legitimized 
recipe in the institutional environment for how to design part of organizations.  The 
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purpose of organizing hospitals as enterprises was to decentralize the management process, 
producing more efficient management, improve access to information and delegate financial 
responsibility within the health policy objectives. Through structural devolution, the 
intention was to achieve less bureaucracy, an improved ability to manage and enhance user 
information. Despite being able to uncouple steering from rowing considerable amount of 
decision making power still remains at the top of the hierarchy.  For example, the minister 
of health, in theory, can instruct the regional health authority and overturns board decisions 
through a number of steering devices (OECD 2003). The health enterprises management 
options and flexibility are constrained by detailed policy framework and as a result they 
continue to responding to orders rather than changing situations. Managers still find it wise 
to wait for signals from above rather than act as institutional entrepreneurs (Byrkjeflot 
2005). The reforms have not managed to significantly push the decision making power down 
through the hierarchy. The Norwegian state now rules the hospitals both by indirect means 
(quality and performance control, activity based funding) and through directives. 
Consequently, the reforms appear to break with the stated aims of great structural devolution 
and delegation  aimed at loosening the grip of the central control as the study have shown 
that control  is still exerted in a different way. 
The case of Tanzania 
4.5 The Tanzanian health system 
In Tanzania responsibility of providing health care is split between the ministry of health 
and the ministry of local government although the technical ministry remains the ministry of 
health and social services. This because the ownership of the hospitals is divided between 
the two ministries with the ministry of health owning the consultant and regional hospital 
while the ministry of local government takes responsibility of the district hospital and other 
lower level health care facilities.  However the aims remains the same, an  equitable, 
quality and affordable basic health services which are gender sensitive and sustainable, 
delivered for the achievement of improved health status. To fulfil this obligation the 
organizational structure has three levels, the National, Regional and district (local 
authorities).  The Tanzanian health system(see appendix 4) is organized in a referral 
pyramid form, starting from the village level, where there are village posts; ward level where 
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there are dispensaries; divisional level, where there are health centres; district level, where 
there are district or district designated hospital; regional level, where there are regional 
hospitals; zonal level, where there are referral/consultant hospital and national level, where 
there are national and specialized hospitals (MoH 2003).   
 
At the national level, the ministry of health administers and supervises the national hospitals, 
specialized hospital, training institutions, executive agencies and regulatory authorities. At 
the regional level provision is vested to the regional administrative secretary with technical 
assistance of regional health management team (a team of health experts from different 
fields at the regional level). And, at the district, management and administration has been 
devolved into district through their respective council authorities (under ministry of local 
government), health services boards, facility committees and health management teams.  
 
The ministry of health as a technical ministry is the overall responsible for health pertaining 
matters in the country. It outlines national health policy, prepares reforms and proposes for 
legislation, it assists the government in decision making and monitors their implementation. 
While the ministry has administrative responsibility for the subordinate’s agencies and 
national hospital, the regional and district authorities are responsible in their respective 
levels.  Before the 2000 reforms, the Tanzanian health sector could be characterized as a 
semi centralized version of the NHS model with the central government and local 
government sharing the ownership of hospitals; funding was tax based, the main actors being 
public with local authorities having a significant role in health care provision. Reforms has 
brought aboard a number of players including for profit and not for profit  private  
organization, while the insurance schemes and co payments have supplemented the 
financing of the health care.  
4.5.1 The reform context 
Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world. A little more than a half its citizens 
live on less than US $ 0.70 a day.  A life expectancy of 51 years and health expenditure of 
$8.00 per person per year are among the worst in Africa (UNDP 2001). Most major health 
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problems are caused by poverty related diseases such as Malaria, which could be controlled 
or prevented by public health interventions. Communicable diseases have resurged and the 
current HIV/AIDS prevalence of 5% looks set to decrease the domestic product by 15-20% 
by 2010.  The health sector is pitiful under resourced with current level of finance by the 
government meets only one third of the requirements of the public health system (Brown 
2000).  The infrastructure is poorly developed and the intended referral system is often 
bypassed.  
Health care reforms initiatives in Tanzania are not new phenomenon with the current reform 
wave being the fourth since independence in 1960. Reform waves started in the post 
independence era , 1960s, when efforts were aimed at moving the health sector from curative 
to preventive and health services. The impacts of these early initiatives became clear in 
1970s (MoH 1998). The Primary Health Strategy Care 1970s-1980s, represented a very 
ambitious period for health sector development, with emphasis on rural infrastructure 
development and training of manpower.  However, the economical slump that ravaged the 
country in the 1980s adversely affected the health services and reversed some of the gains 
from the previous decade. Despite an extensive network of health facilities across the 
country, the quality of services deteriorated and affected people’s health status adversely. 
The country started to experience drug shortages, dilapidated infrastructures, and inadequate 
services. It also became clear that the management of health services and lines of authority 
and responsibility did not figure well for a system geared at providing equitable health 
services. In late 1980s, the government resolved to reform all sectors in order to improve 
efficiency and accessibility of services to the communities. The government embarked on a 
process of fundamental change in policy and institutional arrangements, but it was not until 
1994 that health sector reform document was approved by the government (MoH 1994 b). 
Being a donor dependent country the Tanzanian government is far from being autonomy in 
policy formulation. Donors who fund more than 50% of the total health spending (Alice 
Shine 2003) must viewed in the wider context of (shifting) opinion among  the influential. 
As suggested by Mogedal and Steen (1995), the health reforms in African countries 
including Tanzania, are not initiated by the usual agenda setting model but founded and 
pursued by donors i.e. environmental determinism. 
Politically, Tanzania has been led by a single left wing part since gaining its independent 45 
years ago. Despite changing leadership in two occasions and the introduction of multi-party 
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democracy in 1995 the same party has remained in power to date. In that respect the country 
has had no major political ideological shift and has always been promoting equity, fairness, 
justice and to a certain degree, participation. This was reinforced in 1967 by adoption of 
Arusha declaration which declared free health for all and that the means of production were 
to be owned by the government. Subsequently in 1977 a law was passed that prohibited 
practice of medicine for profit (private for profit). Because of this health care has until 
recently been regarded as public commitment, to be provided by the government free of 
charge.  However, such policies were inadequately implemented and financed due to a 
number of reasons including world economical recession in 1980s leading to economical 
crisis and subsequent reforms to increase resources and efficiency in health care provision.  
4.5.2 The reforms 
The current Health Sector Reforms (HSR) reforms in Tanzania took effect from 1994(MoH 
1994a) and was aligned together with other sector adjustment reforms in 2000. The changes 
consequent to health sector reform involved re-defining priorities, refining policies, and 
reforming institutions through which those policies were to be implemented.  The reform 
herald a change in roles. The ministry of health is now mainly a facilitator (at least in paper) 
and a key player in policy formulation, legislation, regulation and quality control. One of the 
most fundamental changes was devolution of power to the districts and introduction of 
alternative sources of funding and incorporation of different actors in the health sector (MoH 
2000). The affiliation form of the consultant hospitals was changed from that of a public 
administrative body to a health enterprise. As in other in developing countries the reforms in 
Tanzania were adopted largely due to external pressure and an ailing economy as a solution 
to an escalating cost in health care, budgetary deficiencies, inefficiency health system and 
changing public expectation (Cassels, 1995a). 
Overall, the goals of the health sector reforms were (MoH 1994): 
• To improve health status and consumer satisfaction by increasing the effectiveness 
and quality of services 
• To obtain greater equity by improving the access to the disadvantaged groups to 
health care 
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• To obtain grater value for money (cost effectiveness) from health spending by 
considering improvement in both the distribution of resources to priority activities 
(allocative efficiency) and the maximization of output from a given set of inputs 
(technical efficiency). 
 
 The major contents of the reforms incorporated systematic, programmatic, organization and 
instrumental levels of its systems, specifically (MoH 1994b) it included: 
a) Ideological reforms which involved changing the role of the central government to 
that of a facilitator in the provision of health care rather than being a provider and 
abandoning the principles of free health care services for all 
b) Organizational reforms which included changes in administrative structure through 
the creation of autonomous professional council and autonomous district health 
boards and, support of the community health care based activities. Also, legislation 
of the executive agencies act which will allow the establishment of executive 
agencies of the consultant hospital to render services autonomously; functional 
review of the MoH planning and financial budgeting, training of workers and 
establishment of new promotion schemes. The major policy changes in HSR were 
decentralization by devolution by transferring power from the central government to 
the local authority which manages the districts. 
c)  Managerial reforms which included transferring the management of health services 
and the district hospitals to local authorities, a decentralized scheme for the post of 
District Medical officer(DMO) ‘in charge of health services in the district’, changing 
in the way of appointment( posts to advertised and appointment follows competition) 
and establishing an appropriate accounts to access funds for health care. 
d) Public private mix reforms which included legalization of previous banned private 
practitioners as well as fostering the partnership existing among public, faith based 
organization and private for profit organization. 
e) Establishment of the client charter, a social pact between the MoH as a facilitator of 
health services provision and receivers. The role of the client service charter is to 
provide quality health services that meet clients’ satisfactions.  The MoH was to 
help clients to understand the services delivery commitments, mean of 
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communication, ways of achieving the service standards means of correction of 
mistake done and how to claim their rights. 
 
Decentralization and autonomy can be said to be the major theme of the HSR in Tanzania. 
The decentralization took in three domains; political, financial and administrative (Local 
Government Reform Component, 1996).  Political decentralization devolved decision 
power, to regional and the district council. The districts were given sole power to plan, 
prioritize and allocate resources (Districts are administrative geographical areas with a 
population size between 50,000 and 500,000 depending on the part of the country). The role 
of the central government remained that of a policy maker and facilitator. Formally, the 
vertical health programmes were also decentralized and integrated to the local councils. The 
highest authority was vested to the district council and district health boards.  Financial 
decentralization was to enable the council levy local taxes to meet their obligation to render 
social services to the community. Central government was obliged to give grants to local 
government with a specified amount of money to run the social services. Government were 
to top up funds from local sources and alternatives sources to finance the health services. i.e. 
cost sharing, and establishing health insurance. Administrative decentralization was to 
decouple the local government staff from their ministries.  
As it was in the case of Norway the organizational change also necessitated alternative 
means of control. Similar methods can be seen here, the ministry of health appoints board 
members to the health enterprises. The enterprise also sign contract with the parent 
ministries on how to manage the services. At the district and regional level board members 
are elected from the general public with direction from the ministry. Funding through block 
grants or national insurance also dictates how the services are to be provided and is linked to 
performance. The client charter service is available by law to all hospitals acts as a watch 
dog on the quality of the services provided. Another source of control in Tanzania is 
associated with the impact of competitiveness, outsourcing and contracting on public 
employees. From late 1990s there has been significant reduction in public sector workforce 
after outsourcing and retrenchment. This creates a sense of powerless and is often associated 
with work intensification as the reduced workforce seeks to deliver same level of services.  
This fear associated with job insecurity is a subtle form of control which denies 
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empowerment and trust (Burgess and MacDonald 1999).  Also important is the greater 
reliance of on performance management such as performance appraisal and peer review. 
In summary, the health sector in Tanzania have to a great extent  recasted  the arguments 
coined by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) that to solve the management problem governments 
should separate service delivery and compliance functions from policy focused departments 
that housed them- to separate steering from rowing. Second, it should give service delivery 
and compliance agencies much flexibility and autonomy. And third, it should have to hold 
those agencies accountable for results, through performance contracts and hence fulfilling 
the study’s requirement for a sector to have been reforming based on NPM ideas. The 
reforms managed to a bigger extent to copy and use such arrangement that involved 
separation of policy separation and services delivery. The ministry of health remained 
responsible for policy making while the consultant (now working as health enterprises), and 
the district hospitals are responsible for the provision of services under their respective 
health boards.  The ministry of health still retained some responsibilities of provision at the 
regional level through the regional secretariat .These new arrangements also devolved 
responsibility to the decentralized units that became responsible for expenditure. At the same 
time, funding is linked with performance, and closely monitored and linked from the center 
by contracts.  Service contracts were also entered between the centre and the lower 
hierarchies to produce plans which specify which services to be provided and the targets to 
be reached which are used as a yardstick to provide funds.  Another source a subtle form of 
control is fear associated with job insecurity associated with the impact of privatization, 
retrenchment, outsourcing and contracting on the health sector employee which have 
rendered the employees powerless.  
However, having an egalitarian culture the reforms never found a fertile ground in Tanzania 
resulting in a number of dilemmas and questions in its inception and implementation. For 
example, the ministry officials were worried that if managers are guided by rational self 
interest why should they be trusted to perform in public interest? Would the entrepreneurial 
model under mine democratic values of fairness, justice, representation and participation?  
Given the above reasons and the institutional capacity limitation of the country it not a 
surprise that Tanzania reforms have not full implemented the NPM prescriptions. The 
reforms are little bit edited, they are not just a pure market and management model, 
competition is limited and the hospitals are not privatized.  
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4.6 Findings and Comparison  
  Table 2:  Findings 
Dimensions Variables Norway Tanzania
Formal structure • Presence of departments as main 
organizations units 
• Lack of ministerial cabinets 
• Decentralization  
• Substantial autonomy of agencies 
vs. dependency 
Yes 
 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Institutionalization of 
Market elements 
• Competition  
• Contracting out 
• Privatization 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Processes • Presence of instruments for rational 
planning and MBO 
• Presence of instruments for 
performance control 
• Presence of standards for service 
quality (clients charter) 
• Presence of instruments for civil 
servant evaluations 
• Presence of instruments for de-
legification and streamlining 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
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Norway Tanzania 
1 Environment
• Economy
• Ideology Left wing Left wing
2 Polity 
• Constitutional 
3 Administrative culture
• Institutional traditional
• Style of governance A sovereign, rationally
bounded state, based on
law, rules and cooperation
A sovereign rationally
bounded state, based on
law and cooperation.
However, compliance of
rules is questionable
Multiparty with minority
government
Multiparty with a
dominant Single  ruling
party
Strong statist tradition,
concept of good public
sector, equality and mutual
trust.
Strong statist tradition,
concept of good public
sector, equality with less
mutual trust
Table 3: the explanatory variables ‘the context’
Economically sound,
modernized system
Economical crisis ,
donor dependent.
Underdeveloped system
 
 
Analyses of two the countries health systems (see table 3 and 4) have shown the followings: 
First, from the structural point of view, efforts concerning the vertical dimension have to a 
certain extent been implemented in both countries.  Even if information on the actual 
changes is rather incomplete especially from Tanzania, in both countries there has been an 
introduction of semi independent organizational units. These units have been granted power 
from the central government on the basis of negotiated budgets and framework of 
agreements. Notwithstanding national identity the administrative agencies have three 
characteristics in common. Desegregations (that is, organizational separation from the parent 
ministry); Autonomization or deregulation (that is, a certain degree of discretion over 
internal functioning and rules and contractualization (that is, the existence of contractual 
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arrangements between agency and department which establish performance targets and 
goals. 
Although both implemented the reforms, their trajectories differed. Norway which had a 
good economy, modernized health system within the state of strong statist traditions, the 
reformed late and the process did not involve radical changes. Tanzania had also a strong 
statist tradition but with an underdeveloped, donor dependent underfinanced system. The 
reform process was radical, started earlier. There were also similarities in the reform process 
between the two countries. In both countries the reforms are not comprehensive to the 
prescribed recipe, they are little bit edited to conform to respective countries culture; they 
are not just a pure market and management model. For example, hospitals are not privatized 
and the reforms do not go too far in promoting market mechanism.  
Second, in the administrative processes a prominent managerial restyle is found in both 
countries. There is reassertion of the centre, where by despite decentralization centrally 
controlled bureaucracies have proven enduring in both countries. The reforms have not 
managed to significantly push the decision making power down through the hierarchy.  
Other forms of control, management by contracts and results have replaced command 
control.  Citizens are now a collection of customers with commercial rather than political 
relationship to the organizations; hence legitimacy is based on substantive performance and 
cost efficiency rather than compliance with formal rules and procedures. The new methods 
of controls includes; how the board members are elected, different type of acts and 
agreement entered between the centre and sublevels, through financing of the services, and 
performance management system.   
The reforms appear to break with the stated aims of great structural devolution and 
delegation which aimed at loosening the grip of the centre and giving more autonomy to the 
lower hierarchies as control is still exerted from above albeit in a different ways.   
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4.7 Summary 
The chapter has tried to describe and analyze the two health systems in the context of the 
wider debate about the shift from bureaucracy to post bureaucracy. Preference for post 
bureaucracy is a characteristic of the discourse of the new public management, which has 
been influential in the recent public sector reforms.  
The analysis showed that; first, there has been a pronounced shift towards the creation of 
operationally decentralized units with a simultaneously attempt to increase centralized 
control over strategy and policy. Second, the principles of competition (though not 
prominent) have become the dominant methods of coordinating activities of the 
decentralized units. Third, there has been a substantial development of processes of 
performance management and monitoring (including audits, inspections, quality assessments 
and reviews), again a phenomenon largely directed towards operationally decentralized 
units. Taken together these three strategies do not describe a simple movement from a 
bureaucratic to a post bureaucratic form, rather they combine a strong element of innovation( 
entrepreneurial  bureaucracy) with the reassertion of fundamentally bureaucratic 
mechanism(Hoggett,1996). Thus, the findings reported here do not confirm initial 
expectation that public sectors have become post bureaucratic. The study has shown that 
new form of controls and new methods of formalizations, the market rather that the political 
controls are in place in both countries.  
Another observation from the study include, the reform processes and effects showing both 
elements of convergence and divergence. In both countries the NPM recipe is not fully 
complied, the reforms are edited for example hospitals are not privatized and the reforms do 
not go too far in promoting market mechanism. The process also differed between the 
countries, where Norway was late, non radical and hesitating reformer Tanzania more open 
and vulnerable to the reforms, started earlier and its reforms were more radical. 
So why bureaucracy has managed to survive despite the discourse of NPM and second, why 
the reforms have had some differences and similarities trajectories?  Why did the countries 
fail to fully comply with the subscribed NPM recipe? The following chapter intends to 
discuss and highlights some possible explanations and arguments for the said observations. 
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5. NPM inspired Health Reforms and Bureaucracy: 
Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
Description and analysis of the two health systems in the preceding chapter has revealed that 
despite implementing reforms characteristics of bureaucracy still exist in the respective 
systems. Process control over the bureaucracies have been retained evolving form one form 
to another and augmented.  Second, the reforms have not been comprehensively 
implemented in both countries-‘they are edited’ and third, reforms process and effects are 
characterised both by differences and similarities. So why has bureaucracy managed to 
survive and evolve from one form of control to another rather that being banished or 
reinvented?  Why have the reforms trajectories differ? This chapter intends to discuss, first, 
the possible explanations for bureaucracy resilience in the broader context of public 
administration and NPM dynamics. Second, it will deliberate arguments for the differences 
in reform trajectories and thirdly, the chapter will discus about the suitability of a single 
perspective in contemporary organizations. 
5.2 Bureaucratic model essential to good public management 
Characterized by-hierarchy, specialization and standardization, Bureaucracy is taken to 
mean centralized decision making as well as command and control systems; organizational 
fragmentation and turf protection; and rules, regulations and procedures imposed on those 
who manage the organizations by armies of programs and functional specialists.  The 
problems and deficiencies in the management of such organization are argued to be the 
consequences of both the bureaucracy and the bureaucrats, i.e. the system and the people 
working on them. The criticisms are in two folds, either the administration is not 
bureaucratic enough or that it is excessively bureaucratic. In the first instance the 
bureaucrats are considered the problem: lazy, wasteful and incompetent, at best; rude, self-
aggrandizing and corrupt, at worst. Laws are not executed in competent manner and 
commands from above are not followed.  In contrast the bureaucracy bashers seek to 
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deflect the criticism to the system that rules are followed slavishly and that bureaucrats are 
portrayed victims of deficient public management system. Recent criticism of public 
administration has both elements with the later being more predominant (Olsen 2005).  
The critics of bureaucracy assume that systems, as formal structures, alone determine the 
behaviour and organizational performance. According to this script, if we do away with 
bureaucratic systems, we do away with bureaucratic behaviour, or, specifically, if we do 
away with hierarchy, we do away with that which stifles change and innovation; if we do 
away with specialization, we do away with the “stovepipes” and “silos” that impede 
cooperation in providing advice to policy makers and services to citizens; if we do away 
with standardization, we do away with the red tape that obstruct a focus on citizens(Aucoin 
1997). The error of this script is that it ignores the consequences of individual behaviour 
which might have accrued as a result of informal norms and values over time or laws, rules, 
regulations which govern its conduct of public business. Another problem with this message 
is that while it is documented how formal public administration organizations matters and 
that administrators are influenced by rules and structural setting in which they act, state-of –
the art reviews have so far little to say about the relationships between organizational 
structures and administrative behaviour( Egeberg 2003,120). Olsen ascertains the idea by 
pointing out that the relationship is rather contested. Formal structures can be highly 
consequential but also a facade or empty shell, overwhelmed by informal structure and 
external resource distribution. They are also not the only factor at play, and administrative 
organization can provide a framework rather that an ‘iron cage’ determining administrative 
mentality, behaviours and outcomes.  
It is in this respect that the bureaucracy bashing is believed to be a wrong diagnosis. 
Characteristics of bureaucracy are needed for good public management which is essential to 
good governance and because representative democracy requires the use of hierarchy and 
bureaucratic ethos (Aucoin 1997; du Gay 2000; Goodsell1983; Meier 1997; Peters and 
Pierre 2003b). Reforms demand increased attention to team work and horizontal 
coordination, flatter management structures and integrated delivery, and more delegation and 
decentralization. But such demands does not eliminate requirement of hierarchy or do away 
with specialization, and does not imply an absence of standards. Good government, at 
minimum, requires organizational designs that promote democratic direction, control and 
accountability. Public bureaucracy serves best  these ends because through its hierarchies 
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make roles clear and transparent; in specialization it  facilitate objective, mission and tasks 
of the government, and through standardization the work of public management is subjected 
to best practices for achieving results that are efficient, economical and effective.  Thus, the 
challenge to the reformers has been how to develop new organizations that supports good 
governance that will provide integrated services, policy to deal with horizontal issues and 
devolve management.  Such arrangements call for the reformers to move in opposite and 
even different directions in order to provide integrated service delivery, to developing 
policies to deal with horizontal issues and to devolve management authority. It comes to a no 
surprise that the reforms embrace simultaneously both centralization and decentralization.  
Provision of integrated services and development of policies to deal with horizontal issues 
calls for designs that reduce or overcome specialization or differentiation of government 
organization, because these are seen as fragmentation or  obstacles to serving citizens as 
whole person with multiple needs or formulating policies which cuts across the organization 
boundaries. Such arrangements may be very difficult if organizing for a larger organization 
because citizens have multiple and cross cutting identities. Hence, provision of integrated 
services and horizontal control requires a kind of a structure for the front lines. For services 
to be perfect those on the front must address the multiple requirements of the services in 
question which needs organization.  Secondly, in many, if not most, cases of integrated 
delivery services are delivered by those not directly accountable responsible for design and 
implementation. This requires direction, control and accountability be realized by other 
means other than direct contact. This entails the using standardization of output and or 
process. In  instance where this approach is deemed not appropriate or sufficient , the 
necessary coordination can be affected by what  Mintzberg calls ‘mutual adjustment’ , that 
is the managed communication and cooperation of individual who are in direct superior 
subordinate relationships but whose collaboration is necessary for integrated service 
delivery. Neither of these features of integrated services delivery means that bureaucracy 
model is irrelevant to the organization task at hand. The same arguments are relevant to 
horizontal policy organizations. 
On the other hand, Devolving management aims at enhancing efficiency in resource 
management and responsiveness. Both call for greater devolution of responsibilities 
apparently pushing the organization in opposite direction of that taken to meet the first two 
challenges.  This separation of policy and operational responsibilities does not conflict with 
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principles of good public management (Aucoin 1990). Giving examples of Canada, Aucoin 
argues that such organization design confirms that principles of hierarchy, specialization and 
standardizations are crucial in obtaining democratic direction, control and accountability. 
And more specifically the lesson confirmed that the bureaucratic model does not rule out 
design to accommodate arms length relationship, to recognize the important of separating 
responsibilities and to delegate a considerable amount of power to cooperate management.   
It is in the same vein that the reforms of the two health systems while decentralizing and 
devolving power to lower hierarchies the central government control was simultaneously 
enhanced. Command controls were replaced by market control methods to enforce team 
work and horizontal coordination and to enhance provision of integrated services. 
Standardization of output and/or process is necessitated as a primary means of coordination 
and also as a leeway for political enforcement of democracy.  Neither of these features 
means that bureaucracy model is irrelevant to organizations; hierarchy, specialization and 
standardization still find its importance even in complex integrated set ups. As in the case of 
integrated service delivery system the horizontal policy organizations need be non 
bureaucratic. Exactly the same arguments applies, horizontal policy mechanism are likely to 
succeed if they respect the integrity of the arrangement of hierarchy, specialization and 
standardization that applies to the organizations.  In devolved management, managers are 
required to set performance target and measures and reporting on them. Control is thus at 
arm length using performance targets and contractual arrangements. 
Each of the three reform ideals on its own way has showed that the principles of 
bureaucracy; hierarchy, specialization and standardization are still crucial in obtaining 
democratic direction, control and accountability as well realizing efficiency, and 
responsiveness. It can then be argued in the same vein that controls have been retained in the 
post bureaucratic organizations in Norway and Tanzania in order to coordinate, enforce 
policy and accountability.  Bureaucracy has proved to be necessary for good governance to 
promote rule of law and public service values and should not be defined only by its 
corrupted expressions. However, the necessity and resilience of bureaucracy described here 
is not only specific to the Norway and Tanzania health system but can better be understood 
in the wider picture.  
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5.3 The master trend of history 
Max Weber split personality as a sociologist, on one hand and a transcendental idealist 
historian, on the other hand, has from time to time occasioned comment on the organization 
literature. This duality of posture in Weber’s work appears in particular to have a rather 
interesting consequences for the lines along which contemporary organizational theory has 
developed. Weber saw the growth of bureaucratic organization as an inevitable product of 
long historical development towards rationalization of human organization and cooperation 
and predicted that bureaucracy would be a dominant organizational in modern world. Weber 
(1978) wrote…..‘The development of modern form of organization in all fields is nothing 
less than identical with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic administration. 
This is true of church and state, of armies, political parties, economical enterprises, interest 
groups, endowments, clubs, and many others… the choice is only that between bureaucracy 
and dilettantism in the field of administration.’ Rationalization in bureaucratic organization 
is one among Weber’s ideas which can be associated with the discourse of NPM.  The 
development of NPM is one of the latest and most significant manifestations of what Weber 
called the process of rationalization, the quest for greater calculability and precision in the 
management of human affairs (Gregory 2007).   
Rationalization according to Weber referred to ….. ‘The process by which explicit, abstract, 
intellectually calculable rules and procedures are increasingly substituted for sentiment, 
traditional, and rule of thumb in all spheres of activity. Rationalization leads to the 
displacement of religion by specialized science as a major source of intellectual  authority; 
the substitution of trained expert for cultivated man of letters; the ousting of skilled hand 
workers by machine and technology; the replacement of traditional judicial wisdom by 
abstract, systematic statutory codes. Rationalization demystifies and instrumentalizes life’ 
(Wrong 1970, 26). According to Weber the process of rationalization was unstoppable and 
probably irreversible, though was by no means linear and consistent across time and place. 
His concepts which coincided with the rise of science and industrial capitalist reduced 
administrational of human affairs to calculable, cold, hard, matter of factness; it  made 
manageable complex, large scale task that required central direction; and it concentrated 
power in the hands of those who controlled the bureaucratic apparatus of the state(Gregory 
2007).  
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The same scenario can be observed decades later in the contemporary management albeit 
with a slight different picture. NPM movement was initiated by technocrats in the 
government who rejected combining politics and political process which they believed to be 
irrational, self seeking and opportunistic. The technocrats favoured intellectualization (which 
was used interchangeably with rationalization in Weber’s writings) of government issues 
and problems and the search for and implementation of theory driven policies. Such ideas 
were the basis of NPM movements which went on to advocate political and social driven 
changes based on strong theoretical foundations. It stresses on operational, managerial rather 
that democratic improvement. The NPM movement can thus be better understood not as a 
replacement of bureaucracy but a refinement of it, to enhance its precision of process and, 
calculability of its results.  Bureaucratization itself, where modern organizations 
increasingly measure up to ideal type, is a key component in Weber’s idea of rationalization 
and is commonly seen as a vital hallmark of political- economical development. Under NPM 
type reforms, precision and calculability are enhanced to the extent public goods and 
services are provided as commodities in a market place. The movement mirrors and 
reinforces rationalization and going further to a degree that human beings are increasingly 
instrumentalized as Weber pointed out in much cited passage……....‘bureaucracy develops 
the more perfectly the more bureaucracy is ‘dehumanized’, the more completely it succeeds 
in eliminating from official business love, hatred and all purely personal, irrational, and 
emotional elements which escapes calculation’. (Weber 1974)  
The NPM ideas whether adopted by centre left or centre right government has a central 
theme of rolling back the state then to depoliticize more and more areas of policy making, 
such motives mirrors Weberian rationalization in that objective sciences are brought into 
play to replace those politically bargained outcomes, since the latter are driven less by the 
intellect than by interest and passions. Under NPM the degree of human beings is 
increasingly de humanized as such it can be correctly to say that the challenge of the 21st 
century organizations is not to banish bureaucracy but designing it in a way that best adapts 
the requirements of hierarchy, specialization and standardization to serve the ends of 
democratic direction, control and accountability, as well as end of effective public policy, 
productive public management and responsive public services. 
The same can be said to Norway and Tanzania. Accordingly, the two health systems have 
been trying to rationalize their health systems, before and after the reforms contingent to 
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their respective environmental, polity and administrative culture factors.  In the two 
countries the respective health systems have increasingly trying to reduce human affairs to 
calculable ,hard matter of factness; intellectually calculable rules and procedures have been 
continuously replacing sentiment, traditional, and rule of thumb in all spheres of activity. 
Rationalization can be seen as an element of both the bureaucratic and post bureaucratic 
organizations.  It is in this respect that Rationalization as a component of New Public 
Management reforms will not replace bureaucracy but compliment and reinforce it. 
5.4 Unintended effects of social action 
When Weber’s writings were translated into English, about the middle of the last century, 
they attracted an enormous amount of scholarly attention in the English speaking world. For 
example, Robert Merton’s (1943) article showed that a fundamental failure of bureaucracy 
was its tendency to foster goal displacement.  This seminal work remains one among the 
classic examples of eliciting unintended consequences from human action and intervention. 
For Merton, common sources of unanticipated consequences include limited information, 
various forms of erroneous assumptions or tunnel vision and self defeating prophecies. The 
same Mertonian analysis can be used to discussing the possible reasons of bureaucracy 
resilience in the contemporary organization reforms. Numerous neo Mertonian analyses 
have been recently observed in the process of institutional reforms, one neo –Tocquevillian 
is used as an example in this study.    Neo –Tocquevillian paradox identified unintended 
effects of executive government reforms in recent observed studies of public service reforms 
(Hood and Peter 2004).  Previously, Alexis de Tocqueville (1949), argued that post 
revolutionary France, apparently sweeping away all the administrative practices and 
methods of the Bourbon ancien regime, only succeeding in developing those practice to 
higher degree.  Several analogues to the Tocquevillian paradox can be detected in the 
contemporary government reforms process. For instance, the best known bureaucracy 
bashers Osborne and Gaebler, popularized  a common claim that the central thrust of public 
management reforms was to replacement of ‘rule-based’, ‘process driven routines’ by 
increasing emphasis on ‘result orientation’ was one  of the key tenets of the reforms 
because according to them… ‘the people who work in the government are not that problem, 
the systems in which they work  are the problem’.   
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The underlying idea here was that decreasing emphasis on ex ante and processual control 
over public managers in favour of ex post evaluation of results creating more discretionary 
space for managers. But as our study has shown the idea of shifting control in this direction 
is questioned. The controls over bureaucracies in the Norwegian and Tanzania health 
systems have been retained albeit in a different form. Process control in the two systems has 
also been augmented with increased formality and regulation imposed upon them over the 
course of the NPM reforms.  The two bureaucracies have shown that they have remained 
processsual and compliance oriented, in spite of the persistent rhetoric judgment by results. 
The reforms have thus produced unintended bureaucratic activities ‘neo - Tocquevillian 
paradox’ with more rules and process driven compliances than the traditional forms of 
public bureaucracy.  Such observations which have also been found elsewhere (see Hogget 
1996; Hood et al 1999) elicit the case of Mertonian unintended effects of human social 
action and intervention working at its best.  
5.5 A need of integrated perspective? 
Drawing on organizational forms presented in the contemporary reform debate, three distinct 
ways of organizing are portrayed as alternatives. These are bureaucratic, market and network 
organization based on achieving rationality, accountability and control; mobilizing resources 
and compliance; and organizing feedback from society respectively. Each of the 
organization form has elements of truth and provides useful insights into organizational 
functioning. But, at the same time each is incomplete given the pluralistic societies with 
variety criteria of success and different causal understanding. An administration that 
simultaneously has to cope with such contradictory demands and standards, balance system 
coordination, and legitimate diversity organizationally and technologically is likely to 
require more complexity that a single principle can provide (Olsen 2004b). Olsen suggests 
that one possibility is to see polity and society as consisting of dependent but partly 
autonomous institutional spheres of thought and action within which large scale institutional 
differentiation has taken place including institutionalization of bureaucracy.  
The political-administrative systems then can be resolved into partly supplementing and 
partly competing administrative forms and mechanism of governing- including hierarchies, 
voting systems, price systems and competitive markets and cooperative networks (Dahl and 
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Lindblom 1953) in periods the different institutions are in balance. Nevertheless, there is 
strain between institutions and Weber suggested dynamics could be understood between 
bureaucratic routinization and charismatic political leadership. On different times, he went 
on to elaborate,  the economy, politics, organized religion, science, and so on can call lead 
or be lead and one can not be reduced to another. At transformative points in history, 
institutions can also come in direct competition (Gerth and Wright Mills 1970). 
Contemporary political- administrative orders routinely faces institutions imbalances and 
collision. There are shifting interrelations and strains between foundations norms.  There 
are intrusions and attempts to achieve ideological supremacy over other institutional spheres. 
But there is also institutional defence against the invasion of unfamiliar norms and typical 
the institution under attack re-examines its pact with society; its rationale, identity, and 
foundations and its ethos, codes of conduct, loyalties and primary allegiances (Merton 
1973).  Such re-examination has been going on lately in contemporary public 
administration and there has been a rebalancing of the core code of institutions of modern 
society (Olsen 2005). And the available observation does not support the prediction that 
administration converge of a single form and that bureaucratic organization is a nonviable 
form of administrative organization. Rather, bureaucratic organization may become more 
important in increasingly heterogeneous societies, as part of a public administration 
organized on basis of several competing principles 
5.6 The reform context 
Literature on organizational theory and in particular cultural perspective can also contribute 
to the discussion of the study findings, specifically on the observation of convergence and 
divergence of reform trajectory as well as the effects of reforms in Norway and Tanzania. 
Although the study did not investigate directly into the values of two health organizations, 
the results of questionable shift to post bureaucracy can be seen as surrogate to bureaucratic 
values. The results are consistence with previous studies that highlights resilience of 
organizational values. Existing studies shows that the process of changing organization 
culture is deeply ingrained in the underlying norms and values of the organization and can 
not be imposed from above (Beer 1990).  The two countries have left wing ideologies 
which have strong practice of giving the central government control over economy, planning 
and policy, equality, a concept of good public sector and a de emphasis on economical 
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factors on economical affairs all of which resulted in NPM to be implemented cautiously, 
reluctantly and modified. The reforms were paying more attention to the structure of the 
organizations but as Christensen and colleagues said …..‘an organization is the skeleton, 
where as an institution is the flesh and blood. Both elements are important’ and as a result 
the study observed convergence in the process where by the reforms were not fully 
comprehended in both countries.  
Divergence can also be attributable to the reform context or the explanatory factors. The 
study has shown that the main ideas of NPM were implemented in both countries though at a 
varying degree, pace and emphasis. Norway was economy sound, resulting in weaker 
environmental pressure, their Rechsstaat culture with strong egalitarian norms were less 
compatible to NPM values, their multiparty system and coalition government resulted into 
constitution obstacles as a result Norway was a late, slow and reluctant reformer. Tanzania 
on the other hand had also a Rechsstaat culture with strong egalitarian norms however; the 
economy was poor, donor dependent with underdeveloped infrastructure. Tanzania was thus 
vulnerable to external pressure and more open to myth. Consensus on reforms was easily 
reached in a predominant single party government.  Reforms there started earlier, were 
more radical and took a longer time.   
5.7 Summary 
The chapter has highlighted a number of issues that can explain the resilience of bureaucratic 
organization form and reasons for divergence and convergence in reform implementation. 
These include; the necessity of Bureaucratic model essential to good public management; 
rationalization; the paradox of social action; a need of integrated perspective and the reform 
context which are recapped and summarized in following concluding chapter. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
This comparative case study has explored the recent NPM inspired health care reforms 
which took place in Norway and Tanzania. The main focus of the study was to trace the 
effect of the reforms, specifically if they have managed to banish, reinvent or break through 
bureaucracy and if there is a shift from bureaucracy to post bureaucracy. Preference of post 
bureaucracy is a characteristic of the discourse of the New Public Management. Other aims 
of the study included: finding out if bureaucratic organization is an outdated, undesirable 
and non viable, unwanted form of organization; and if the reforms processes of the two 
countries are characterized by any similarities or divergence engendered by national 
differences in economic, environmental, cultural and political administration.  
The study has shown that first; the main ideas of NPM were implemented in both countries 
to certain degrees but at different pace and with different emphasis on various elements. 
Norway was a late, slow and reluctant reformer while Tanzania started earlier and her 
reforms were more radical and took a longer time. The main reason for the variation can be 
explained in terms of transformative approach. Second, the study indicates a continued 
dominance of bureaucratic characteristics within the two systems despite the discourse of 
NPM. The study does not confirm initial expectation that the two health sectors have 
become post bureaucratic. Control still is being exerted from above and the lower hierarchies 
are not that flexible as management by command has only been replaced by management by 
contract and results. Third, still bureaucracy as shown to be a viable form of organization in 
contemporary organizations though not a panacea and an answer to all challenges of public 
administration and fourth, the study has shown that NPM does not travel well, it is not a one 
size fits all model and that contextual factors needs to be considered as they are explanatory 
to the process and outcomes of the reforms. 
Bureaucratic characteristics in the two health sectors have been found to persist despite the 
discourse of the New Public Management reforms. The study has tried to identify a number 
of reasons that might explain the resilience of bureaucracy and the difference in reforms 
trajectory. The highlighted contribution from this study may not be exhaustive but 
contributory to the existing literature. Bureaucracy has been able to survive because: first; it 
is essential to good administration and because representative bureaucracy requires the use 
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of hierarchy and needs the bureaucratic ethos (Aucion 1997; Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Peter 
and Pierre 2003b). Public bureaucracy serves these ends to the extent that it has the 
following features:  
• Hierarchy, so that the exercise of public authority is structured in ways that make roles 
and responsibilities as clear and transparent as possible. 
• Specialization, so that the objectives, missions and tasks of the government are assigned 
in ways that best secure competence for provision of policy advice and service delivery 
,and  
• Standardization, so that the work of public management is subject to best practices for 
achieving results in a way that meets the test of equity, economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
 
In order for bureaucracy to contribute to good public management , and thus good 
governance, it must obtain a reasonable fit with transformations in the political system, the 
challenges and opportunities existing in socioeconomic order, and  the changing character 
of the public workplace with respect to technological developments and expectations of 
those who work their in. There is thus no contradiction in stating that public management 
must remain bureaucratic but, at the same time , be practiced in a way that enable, even 
require, public servants to excise  grater authority, accept increased responsibilities , and be 
subject to enhance accountability (Aucion 1997). The challenge then is to design 
contemporary public organization in way it best adapts the requirements of hierarchy, 
specialization and standardization instead of banishing it.  
However, Bureaucratic organization is not to be a panacea and the answer to all challenges 
of public administration. Public administration faces different challenges, commanding 
different resources, and is embedded in different political and administrative traditions. 
Bureaucracy, therefore, is not the only way to organize public administration, for all kinds of 
tasks and under all circumstances. Bureaucratic organization is part of repertoire of 
overlapping, supplementary, and competing forms coexisting in contemporary democracy, 
and so are market and network organization (Olsen 2005) 
Second, history has prevailed; Weber argued that bureaucracy will remain the dominant 
organization form in modern world and predicted the growth of bureaucratic organization as 
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an inevitable product of a long historical development towards rationalization of human 
cooperation and development. He viewed bureaucratic structure as a rationally designed 
tool, deliberately structured and restructured in order to improve the ability to realize goals. 
Weber (1978) also noted: …once fully developed, bureaucracy is among those social 
structures which are hardest to destroy’… ‘Where administration has completely 
bureaucratized, the resulting system of dominance is practically indestructible’. Nevertheless 
they will changes in control of bureaucracy, and belief in its legitimacy would be modified 
through human deliberation, reason giving and political struggles (Olsen 2005). The 
development of NPM is one of the latest development and significant manifestation of 
rationalization. The NPM movement can thus be seen not as a replacement of bureaucracy 
but a refinement of it, to enhance its precision of process and calculability of its results 
(Gregory 2007).  
Third, the idea of unintended consequences of human action and intervention as pioneered 
by Merton is another reason brought up by this study as possible explanation for the 
resilience of bureaucratic form of organization. More and Turin (1949, 749-95) turned 
Merton’s observation into ‘iron law’ claiming , ‘there is  no exception to the rule that every 
time a culture works out an empirically valid answer to the problem, it there by generate  a 
host of derivative problem’. For Merton, common sources of unanticipated consequences 
include limited information, various forms of enormous assumptions or tunnel vision, and 
self-defeating prophecies. Neo-Tocquevillian paradox which observed the executive 
government reforms that emerged over the last decade fit firmly into the Mertonian tradition. 
The central thrust of NPM reforms was to replace rule based, process driven routines by 
emphasizing results orientation. But as observed in this study and elsewhere (see Hogget 
1996; Hood et al 1999) process controls over bureaucracies have been retained and 
augmented and that increased formality and regulation have been imposed on public 
democracies during the NPM period pointing to new Tocquevillian paradox of producing in 
many domains of bureaucratic activity of a style even more rule based and process driven 
that the traditional forms of bureaucracy.   
Forth, is the reform context contribution. Reforms have  significant resources and energy 
directed at fixing the ‘hardware’ of the system, while the software- the organizational 
culture, the social networks, the values- have been largely ignored. Such imbalance may 
have contributed to the resilience of bureaucracy because literature acknowledge that despite 
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tight relation between values and structure, structure may change without a proportionate 
change in values( Hinings et al 1996, 889).  The difference among the explanatory factors 
also helped to highlight why the two countries had both different and similarities in the 
reform process and results. In economically sound Norway and its Rechsstaat culture with 
modernised system, reforms were delayed, not radical and edited;  while in economically 
crisis Tanzania with underdeveloped donor depend system reforms stated early, were more 
radical but also edited because of her beliefs in statism.  The study has shown NPM not to 
travel very well and is not a universal remedy for general concerns and cannot prescribe a 
“one size fits all” model for all countries. Different countries need different doses of the 
drug NPM based on respective country environmental, polity and administrative cultural 
history. 
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